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INTRODUCTION 
In 1964, United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart, when referring to what 
qualifies as hard-core pornography, coined one of the most famous legal phrases in America: “I 
know it when I see it.”1   This phrase applies equally today in the political and legal battles over 
what type of property qualifies as “blighted” — a designation making private property 
susceptible to government takings and redevelopment by another private party.  Most definitions 
of blight are broad and subjective, which poses a threat to property owners nationwide. 
 Property rights historically have been accorded great respect in American law,2 which is 
why the power of eminent domain – the power to take private property for public use with just 
compensation3 – has been identified as the “despotic” power. 4  In one recent case, homeowners 
in Michigan fought against this despotic power when a county attempted to take their property 
and turn it into a “metropolitan park” to accommodate various private businesses.5  In another 
recent case, homeowners in Connecticut fought to keep their land where the county attempted to 
take it and transfer it to a Pfizer Pharmaceutical Plant.6  This redistribution of land between 
                                                 
1 Jacobellis v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).   
2 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) ( “[R]espect for the sanctity of the home ...  has been 
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”); Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 634 (1829) (“The 
fundamental maxims of a free government seem to require; that the rights of personal liberty and private property, 
should be held sacred.”).  
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2. 
4 See Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 311 (1795); see also James W. Ely Jr., Can the “Despotic” Power 
be Tamed? Reconsidering the Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain, 2003 A.B.A. PROB. & PROP. 31, available 
at http://www.abanet.org/rppt/publications/magazine/2003/nd/ely.html; Roger Pilon, Can American Asset Forfeiture 
Law Be Justified?, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 311, 320 (1994).  
5 See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 784 (Mich. 2004).  Wayne County referred to this as the 
“Pinnacle Project.” Id.  This was a project to construct a business and technology park next to the Wayne County 
Metropolitan Airport that would house private businesses. See id.  According to the Court, these private businesses 
would be pursuing their own “financial welfare.” Id.; see also Alan T. Ackerman, The Changing Landscape and 
Recognition of the Public Use Limitation: Is Hathcock the Precursor of Kelo? 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1041, 1056-
57 (2004) (discussing the background of the Hathcock condemnation). 
6 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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private owners is frequently found to satisfy the public use clause of eminent domain in the state 
and federal constitutions as long as it is motivated by some economic factor enhancing the public 
welfare, such as an increase in tax revenues or jobs. 7  As a result, the public use limitation on the 
government’s power of eminent domain, once vigorously enforced,8 is now considered 
ineffective by many scholars.9   
 Three cases are repeatedly cited for the proposition that public benefits – such as 
economic development and alleviating blight – are valid “public uses” under the eminent domain 
doctrine:  Berman v. Parker,10 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,11 and Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff.12  In Berman, the United States Supreme Court held that the 
concept of public use is “broad and inclusive,” and that a government’s use of its police powers 
to eliminate blight is a valid public use, eloquently stating that communities should be “beautiful 
as well as sanitary.”13  Essentially, this removed the Court from reviewing statutory 
condemnations based on blight.14  Relying partially on Berman, the Michigan Supreme Court in 
Poletown approved the use of eminent domain for purposes of economic development under the 
premise that it would provide “some benefit” to the public, such as providing more jobs or 
                                                 
7 See, e.g.,  Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); 
Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455. 
8 See Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 65 (1998) (discussing that historical limits on the power of eminent domain). 
9 See Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the Public 
Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 295 (2000) (stating that the judiciary has 
reduced the public use requirement “to an ineffectual safeguard of private property rights”); Camarin Madigan, 
Taking for any Purpose?, 9 HASTINGS W.– NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 179, 192 (2003) (stating that the public use 
provision has become “toothless”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 61 
(1986) (stating that the public use limitation is a “dead letter”); Thomas Rose, Transferring Land to Private Entities 
by the Power of Eminent Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355, 359 (1983) (stating that the constitutional limitation 
of public use is not a significant obstacle; most takings are found by the courts to be for a public use). 
10 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
11 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), reversed by County of Wayne v. Hathcock 
12 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
13 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 28-33.  The Court determined that Congress’ statute declaring that the whole territory of 
the District of Columbia was blighted satisfied the public use clause of eminent domain. See id. at 31.   
14 Berman was not binding on state courts because it hinged on the interpretation of the Federal Constitution. See 
County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 785 (Mich. 2004).  However, it was influential because the Fifth 
Amendment’s public use clause is substantially similar to the public use clauses in most state constitutions. 
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increasing the city’s tax revenues.15  Four years later, the U.S. Supreme Court followed suit in 
Midkiff when it upheld the transfer of private property to private entities to prevent the “social 
and economic evils of a land oligopoly.”16   Justice O'Connor renamed the public use 
requirement as a “public purpose” requirement, stating that “where the exercise of the eminent 
domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a 
compensated taking to be proscribed by the public use clause.”17  Relying on Berman, Poletown, 
and Midkiff, a number of states have found that condemnations based on economic development 
and blight clearance satisfy the public use requirement of their eminent domain provisions.18   
                                                 
15 See Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 784 
(Mich. 2004).  Unlike Berman, though, Detroit did not argue that the area was a slum or blighted; instead, the city 
maintained that the public use limitation was fulfilled because a new manufacturing plant would benefit the public 
by providing more jobs and tax revenues. See id. at 457. 
16 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241-42.  
17 Id. at 241. 
18 For reliance on Midkiff:  See, e.g., Post v. Dade County, 467 So.2d 758 (Fla. App. 1985) (citing Midkiff as support 
in its holding that the condemnation based on slum clearance and redevelopment is a valid public use); New Jersey 
Housing and Mortg. Finance Agency v. Moses, 521 A.2d 1307 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (citing Midkiff and 
holding that a shopping center is a “public purpose”). 
For reliance on Berman: See, e.g., City of Birmingham v. Tutwiler Drug Co., Inc., 475 So.2d 458 (Ala. 1985) 
(finding a valid public use and citing Berman for the proposition that review of a legislative judgment is “extremely 
narrow”); Department of Transp. v. Fortune Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 532 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 1988) (citing 
Berman in holding that the purchase of more land than necessary in order to save state money was valid public 
purpose); City of Shreveport v. Chanse Gas Corp., 794 So.2d 962 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Berman for support in 
stating that the court has an “extremely narrow” level of review of legislative judgments of public use);  Courtesy 
Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379 (1963) (relying on Berman in holding that improving the 
Port of New York “is a public purpose supporting the condemnation of property for any activity functionally related 
to that purpose). 
For reliance on Poletown: See e.g., Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 24 (Me. 1983) (citing Poletown for the rule 
that economic development is a public purpose, and thereby holding that the project would benefit the public by 
reviving commerce and job opportunities, and therefore did not violate public use requirement); City of Duluth v. 
State,  390 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1986) (holding that revitalizing deteriorating urban area and alleviating 
unemployment satisfied the public use limitation and citing Poletown for the proposition that proposals to condemn 
and transfer property from one private owner to another is justified on the ground that the economic benefit is a 
public use);  Pappas, 76 P.3d at 12 (holding that the condemnation was a public purpose and citing Poletown for the 
rule that when a project is intended to attack blight, by creating a significant increase in jobs in an area suffering 
from high unemployment, the relocation of one business to make way for a new business is a public purpose.);  
Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 626 (N.C. 1996) (holding that tax favors to private companies 
satisfied the public purpose limitation on the power of taxation and citing Poletown for the rule that government 
expenditures for economic development incentives are constitutional);  City of Jamestown v. Leevers Supermarkets, 
Inc., 552 N.W.2d 365, 372 (N.D. 1996) (citing Poletown for the proposition that broad discretion is given to the 
legislature to use eminent domain for a variety of economic development purposes and finding that commercial 
growth satisfies the public use limitation). 
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In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Constitution as permitting takings 
based solely on economic development. 19  In Kelo v. City of New London,20 the Court held that 
states can utilize their power of eminent domain to take property and transfer it to a private 
entity, under the premise that it will be put to a more economically productive use, as long as the 
state has engaged in a “comprehensive plan of development” for that property.21  The decision 
triggered enormous public outcry, as many realized the effects of Kelo—most homes do not 
produce an economic benefit to the state and under Kelo, they can be taken and transferred to a 
more productive business entity.22   
 The Michigan Supreme Court has narrowed its definition of public use in County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock,23 a case similar in facts to Kelo, but decided quite oppositely.  Hathcock 
addressed whether building a “metropolitan park” for the Wayne County Metropolitan Airport 
was a public use.24  The County justified the condemnation on the grounds that the park would 
create jobs, stimulate private investment, stop population loss, and support “development 
opportunities,” invoking the twenty-five-year-old precedent of Poletown.25  However, the 
Hathcock Court overruled Poletown and adopted a three-part test for determining when a taking 
for private-to-private transfer satisfies the public use requirement in the Michigan Constitution’s 
eminent domain provision:  
                                                 
19 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
20 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
21 Id. at 2661-62 
22 See, e.g., David Barron, Eminent Domain is Dead Long Live Eminent Domain, BOSTON GLOBE, April 16, 2006, at 
D1 (addressing the “widespread opposition” to Kelo and the threat of trading in homes to enhance the tax base); 
Changes Needed to Halt Abuses, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 26, 2006 (stating that Americans were shocked that 
they could lose their homes to a Costco); John M. Broder, States Curbing Right to Seize Private Homes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, at A1 (explaining the swift reaction nationwide to the Kelo decision).  
23 County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).   
24 See id. at 784 (discussing the “Pinnacle Project,” the title placed on County of Wayne’s plan to build a 
“metropolitan park” that would house various private and public businesses). 
25 Id. at 775-76. 
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(1) where “public necessity of the extreme sort” requires collective action; (2) 
where the property remains “subject to public oversight” after transfer to a 
private entity; and  (3) where the property is selected because of “facts of 
independent public significance,” rather than the interests of the private entity 
to which the property is eventually transferred.26 
 
The Court explained that the third prong – when property is taken based on facts of “independent 
public significance” – applies when authorities condemn property for slum clearance or blight 
removal.27   
 Numerous states have recently reconsidered their eminent domain laws to provide greater 
protection to their citizens.28  Today, some have either passed or, at the least, have proposed bills 
seeking to ban private-to-private takings based on economic development.29  Throughout this 
paper, I will call these types of takings Kelo-type takings.  At the same time, however, most 
states, like Michigan, still permit takings if the property has been determine blighted.  This rule 
illustrates a tension between prohibiting Kelo-type takings while permitting takings for private-
to-private transfer based on the all-inclusive concept of blight.   
Determinations that blight removal is automatically a public use is risky considering what 
the outcome would have been in Hathcock if Wayne County had condemned the property based 
on a finding of blight.  For instance, the land could have been “blighted” if local authorities had 
found it economically obsolete,30 a standard that does not seem hard to meet when comparing a 
                                                 
26 Id. at 783. 
27 Id. (explaining that the “need to remedy urban blight for the sake of public health and safety” is a public use 
despite the fact that the property is subsequently transferred to a private entity).  Similarly, in many states, slum and 
blight removal fulfills the public use provision in eminent domain. See also JAMES S. BURLING, AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE, BLIGHT LITE, EMINENT DOMAIN AND LAND VALUE LITIGATION 43 (2003) (giving an outline of the blight 
statutes of all 50 states).  
28 See Broder, supra note 23 (explaining the swift legislative responses to Kelo); Castle Coalition Legislative Center, 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/index.html (detailing legislative responses). 
29 See id.; infra section II. 
30 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.71 (West 1997) (declaring that large areas within the state have become 
blighted, and that the removal of these blighted areas is a public use); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.72(a) (West 
1997) (stating that a blighted area is demonstrated by “such conditions as functional or economic obsolescence of 
buildings”). 
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home to a “metropolitan park” or any other business entity for that matter.31  If this had been the 
case, it is likely that the court would have permitted the taking.32  Thus, the Hathcock Court’s 
decision and states’ responsive legislation seem hollow in their promise because they purport to 
ban condemnations for private-to-private transfer based solely on economic development, but the 
new “public use” test permits these transfers as long as the property is designated as “blighted.”  
This tension will require courts and legislators to revisit this issue.  In sum, Hathcock and states’ 
responsive legislation to Kelo may not be the end of Poletown and Kelo. 
As states propose new laws and courts narrow their interpretation of “public use” to prohibit 
Kelo-type takings, many have recognized that their state’s current blight definitions would 
swallow these new laws.  Section I of this paper discusses the changing interpretations of the 
public use clause from a narrow, property rights oriented view, to a broad view that would allow 
Kelo-type taking.  Section II analyzes Hathcock and recent state and federal legislation 
prohibiting Kelo-type takings, explaining that the interpretation of public use is now slowly 
evolving back to a new limited view.  Section III analyzes the problem that broad blight 
exceptions present as permitting a circumvention of these new prohibitions on Kelo-type takings.  
Section IV addresses recent state legislation that attempt to close this blight loophole by 
requiring the government to prove blight by clear and convincing evidence and shows that this 
standard will not work where there are broad blight definitions in place.  Section V proposes that 
                                                 
31 See DANA BERLINER, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN (2003), 
http://www.castlecoalition.org/publications/report/index.html.  In Lakewood, Ohio, municipalities have declared the 
lack of a two-car attached garage, second bathtubs, and no central air conditioning as evidence of blight, relying on 
terms like “economic and functional obsolescence.” Id. at 166.  In 2002, the City Council approved a finding of 
blight under these terms so that local authorities could build a $100-million development with condominiums, 
restaurants, and retail stores in its place. See id. at 165-66. 
32 See, e.g., Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids, 257 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (holding that participation by a 
“sectarian” hospital as a redeveloper in an urban renewal project where property was found to be blighted is 
constitutional);  In re City of Center Line, 196 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1972) (holding that because the “controlling 
purpose” of the city’s urban renewal plan was to rehabilitate blighted area, fact that development would be by a 
private developer did not make the condemnation unconstitutional). 
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states re-define blight and go back to the more traditional notion by requiring a showing both 
physical and economic evidence of blight.  
I. THE EVOLUTION OF EMINENT DOMAIN 
A. Historical—The Narrow View 
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution saw a close nexus between property rights and other 
personal liberties.33  Although they recognized the need for the power of eminent domain, they 
created significant limitations on this power by requiring that the taking be for a public use and 
that just compensation be paid.34  The Supreme Court, in its early decisions, ratified the Framers’ 
views that property rights were connected to personal liberties.35 
The states reflected this property rights oriented view in their own constitutions when 
they included the same limitations on their governments’ eminent domain powers.  Into the early 
19th century, courts narrowly interpreted the public use requirement, finding the clause satisfied 
                                                 
33 See JAMES MADISON, PROPERTY (1792), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 598 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (“Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the 
various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of government, that 
alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.”).  When the Federal 
Constitution was drafted, the writings of preeminent legal scholars, including John Locke and William Blackstone, 
on the importance of property rights were of particular influence. See Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property 
Rights in America and the Property Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 77, 82 (2002); Timothy Sandefur, A 
Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California: A Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of 
“Public Use,” 32 SW. U. L. REV. 569, 595-97 n.129 (2003). 
34 James W. Ely, Jr., Can the "Despotic Power" Be Tamed? Reconsidering the Public Use Limitation on Eminent 
Domain, Nov./Dec. 2003 PROB. & PROP. 31, 32 (explaining that the constitutional framers “believed that security of 
property rights was necessary for the enjoyment of individual liberty” and, consequently, it is not surprising that 
they restricted the eminent domain power by adding the just compensation and public use requirements). 
35 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (“The people of the United States erected their Constitutions, 
or forms of government, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to 
protect their persons and property from violence.”); Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 358-59 
(C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (“[I]t is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one 
of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their 
subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced 
them to unite in society. No man would become a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of 
his honest labour and industry. The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social compact.”). 
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in only a limited number of circumstances, such as where the government sought to build parks, 
roads, schools, and hospitals.36 
B. Departing from the Narrow View 
Courts have stated that the concept of public use has no precise meaning.  Instead, it 
changes according to the changing needs of society. 37  In the mid-1900s, states began engaging 
in massive urban renewal campaigns that impacted eminent domain doctrines throughout the 
United States.  These urban renewal campaigns significantly altered the public use clause by 
permitting the government to use their eminent domain powers for transferring property to 
private parties if the taking was to eliminate blight or slum areas.  The public use clause quickly 
broadened again when the government’s attempts to take property and transfer it to a private 
party were upheld where the transfer would provide some economic benefit to the community, 
such as an increase in jobs and tax revenue for the city. 
1. Urban Renewal 
The United States underwent intense urbanization and industrialization throughout the 
late ninteenth and early twentieth centuries.  This not only transformed the American landscape, 
but also resulted in urban planning problems, including the encroachment of commercial and 
industrial properties on residential neighborhoods, inadequate public services, and substandard 
housing conditions.38  The centers of large cities began to economically deteriorate.39  Rapid 
                                                 
36 See 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 7.02[3] (Julius Sackman ed., 3d ed. 1998); Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367 
(1875) (listing examples of commonly recognized public uses justifying the use of eminent domain). 
37 See Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New Takings Jurisprudence: An Evolutionary 
Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577 (1990); Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 
WASH. L. REV. 481 (1983); Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127 (1990).  
38 See ROBERT M. FOGELSON, DOWNTOWN: ITS RISE AND FALL, 1880-1950, 320 (Yale Univ. Press 2001) 
39 See id. at 319-20.  In the 1930s, city authorities recognized the need for more roads leading into and out of cities 
to accommodate rapid population growth. See id. at 317.  As these roads were built, the upper and middle classes 
moved away from the downtown area and into the suburbs, while the lower classes, who could not afford to move, 
remained in the city. See id. at 318.  As smaller business districts arose in the peripheries of the cities, upper classes 
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population growth within these cities had resulted in shortages of adequate housing and 
unsanitary living conditions, especially among lower-income families. 40  As better roads were 
built beyond the city limits, upper-and middle-income families moved into the suburbs, leaving 
behind empty houses and high crime rates.41  City authorities searched for ways to resolve this 
urban crisis, finding eminent domain to be a useful tool in the process.42   
Local and state governments embarked on massive urban renewal campaigns that played 
a crucial role in the broadening of the public use clause. The campaigns focused on revitalizing 
cities through clearance and private redevelopment of large city areas.  Many cities instituted 
urban renewal  planning commissions dedicated to redevelopment.  These commissions were 
frequently given power to intitiate eminent domain proceedings. 
States were aided in their urban renewal efforts by the Federal Government in the United 
States Housing Act of 1937,43 which sought to address substandard housing conditions 
throughout the country.44  This federal recognization of urban decline marked the beginning of 
large public housing projects that quickly became the hallmark of urban renewal.45  The Act 
provided funding to local governments to build public housing, but required that slum housing be 
                                                                                                                                                             
shopped in and visited downtown areas less often. See id. This resulted in severe declines in downtown economic 
prosperity. See id. 
40 See In re Brewster Street Housing Site in City of Detroit, 289 N.W. 493, 496 (Mich. 1939) (stating that the 
continued crowding and unsanitary conditions in Detroit caused the city council to undergo major housing project); 
see also Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent 
Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 22 (2003) (stating that increased vacancies, a rise in taxes, and more housing 
regulations devastated urban landlords throughout the United States, producing support for a “large-scale 
redevelopment of urban areas). 
41 See FOGELSON, supra note 54 at 322 (stating that authorities feared that the conditions of downtown areas would 
“destroy the whole society”). 
42 See In re Brewster, 289 N.W. 493, 496 (Mich. 1939) (stating that the continued crowding and unsanitary 
conditions in Detroit caused the city council to undergo major housing project). 
43 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2004) 
44 See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of 
Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 305, 310-11 (2004) (stating that the United States Housing Act gave private interests 
incentive to redevelop urban areas). 
45 See In re Jeffries, 11 N.W.2d 272, 274 (1943) (city condemned 633 structures via eminent domain in order to 
build better housing in their place).   
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demolished prior to any construction.46  Thus, it was necessary for state legislators to pass 
“enabling legislation” to permit the use of eminent domain for slum clearance when an owner 
declined to sell. 
The Housing Act’s impact on eminent domain doctrines throughout the United States was 
considerable.  The number of urban housing projects substantially increased in both size and 
scope after the Act.47  Throughout the United States, legislation gave municipalities the power of 
condemnation to improve not only housing but also all conditions detrimental to the public 
peace, health, safety, morals, and welfare.48  Property owners questioned whether condemning 
property to clear private property with the intention of transferring the property to private 
developers was indeed a public use.49 
The concept of slums arose out of these urban planning problems. President Hoover 
defined the term in the 1930s as a “residential area where the houses and conditions of life are of 
such a squalid and wretched character . . . [that they have] become a social liability to the 
community.”50  City authorities searched for ways to to remedy the “slum” areas and 
concurrently resolve the urban crisis.  Their answer came from the state’s eminent domain 
powers.51   
                                                 
46 See Gordon, supra note 45, at 310-311.   
47 See id. 
48 See Act of January 9, 1934, No. 18, 1933 Mich. Pub. Acts 46. 
49 See, e.g.,  Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids, 257 F. Supp. 564 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (property owner sued to enjoin city 
from pursuing economic renewal plan where owner’s property was not blighted but was surrounded by blighted area 
and court held that city could properly include); In re City of Center Line, 196 N.W.2d 144 (Mich. 1972) (finding 
that because blight was the “controlling purpose,” condemnation was valid even with subsequent transfer to private 
entity); Sinas v. City of Lansing, 170 N.W.2d 23 (Mich. 1969) (elimination of urban blight by city is an adequate 
justification for exercise of power of eminent domain, even where acquisition is followed by sale to private 
individuals).  
50 PRESIDENT’S CONFERENCE ON HOME BLDG. & HOME OWNERSHIP, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON BLIGHTED AREAS & 
SLUMS 1 (1931). 
51 See In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 289 N.W. 493, 496 (1939) (stating that the continued crowding and 
unsanitary conditions in Detroit caused the city council to undergo major housing project). 
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States employed the power of eminent domain to take “slum” property and transfer it to a 
new private owner for redevelopment and renewal.  The first attempts at urban renewal were 
upheld by courts on the ground that condemnations based on slum removal were related to the 
traditional “police power” objectives, i.e. improving the public health, safety, and welfare.52  
Although local authorities subsequently transferred the property to a private entity for 
development, this was recognized as incidental to the “controlling purpose” of slum clearance.53  
In one case, the Court even took judicial notice that “razing [ ] unsanitary dwellings tends to 
diminish the potentialities of epidemics, crime and waste, and that the destruction of slums at 
their focal centers prevents the spread of crime and disease to uninfected areas and enhances the 
physical and moral values of surrounding communities.”54 
The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of federal urban renewal attempts 
in 1954.  The decision proved very persuasive among state courts.55  The Berman Court 
considered the constitutionality of Congress’ legislation that declared the whole territory of the 
District of Columbia blighted and authorized the removal of this “blight.”56  This legislation, 
reviewed under the Federal Constitution, was found valid under the legislature’s police power.57  
Under the police power, the Court deferred to the legislature’s judgment in determining whether 
the taking was for the public use: “[w]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been 
                                                 
52 See  id. at 335-36 (stating that all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of the condemnation and citing 
cases in different states who agree).  
53 See In re Slum Clearance in City of Detroit, 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951) (upholding the condemnation because 
the public purpose of slum clearance is the one controlling purpose of the condemnation). 
54 In re Edward J. Jeffries Homes Housing Project, City of Detroit, 11 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 1943) (holding that the 
public use requirement of eminent domain was met when the City condemned a housing project on the basis of slum 
clearance). 
55 See cases cited supra note 19. 
56 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954). 
57 See id. at 31-32. Because the legislature is the “main guardian of the public needs to be served by social 
legislation,” the Court stated that the “role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for 
a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.” Id. at 32. 
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declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”58  The Court upheld the condemnation, even though the 
property was transferred to private developers.59  It concluded that the public use requirement in 
the Fifth Amendment is fulfilled when the property taken eliminates the “blighted areas that tend 
to produce slums.”60  The concept of blight and Berman’s impact on it is discussed more fully 
infra section III.   
2. Economic Development 
In 1981, the Michigan Supreme Court decided one of the most influential eminent 
domain cases ever. 61  In Poletown, the Court authorized the City of Detroit’s use of eminent 
domain in the condemnation of private property for subsequent transfer to a private 
manufacturing company.62  The city argued that a new manufacturing plant would benefit the 
public by providing more jobs and increasing tax revenues.63  Notably, the city did not base its 
use of eminent domain on blight removal or slum clearance.  Instead, it relied on Michigan’s 
Economic Development Corporations Act,64 which declared that “programs to alleviate and 
prevent conditions of unemployment and to preserve and develop industry and commerce are 
essential public purposes.”65 
 The Court determined that condemnations based on economic benefits satisfied the 
public use clause under the state’s eminent domain provision.66  Nevertheless, it acknowledged 
that this holding could be subject to abuse by local authorities and, therefore, it provided that 
                                                 
58 Id. at 32. 
59 See id. at 33-34. 
60 Id. at 35. 
61 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d 455, 465 (1981) (overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 685 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 
2004)) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (stating that in 1981, Michigan had 14.2% unemployment, the city of Detroit was at 
18% unemployment, and unemployment among black citizens was at 30%). 
62 See id. at 459-60 
63 See id. at 458. 
64 See id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 459. 
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takings based upon economic development would be subject to “heightened scrutiny.”67  
Although this was an attempt to give some protection to property owners, in effect, the 
heightened scrutiny standard was nothing more than a “fig leaf of legal protection.”68  
Poletown’s holding served to be easily manipulated and enabled private companies and 
developers to acquire land in areas that were economically favorable to business.69 
In his dissent, Justice Ryan strongly criticized the Court’s decision, describing it as 
“jeopardiz[ing] the security of all private property ownership.”70  The Justice analyzed the 
history of the public use clause71 and concluded that “public benefit” is not the same as “public 
use.”72  According to Justice Ryan, the condemnation was the response “of a desperate city 
administration” trying to please “a giant corporation willing and able to take advantage” of this 
opportunity.”73   
Soon after the Michigan Supreme Court decided Poletown, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided another eminent domain case centered on the public use clause.74  In Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff, the Court decided whether the state of Hawaii could permissibly take 
private lands and redistribute them to other private landowners in order to “reduce the social and 
economic evils of land oligopoly.”75  The land in question was a large portion of the Hawaiian 
Islands owned by a very small number of owners.76  According to the state, this concentrated 
land ownership skewed its residential fee simple market, inflated land prices, and injured “the 
                                                 
67 Id. at 459-60. 
68 Adam Mossoff, Foreword to The Death of Poletown: The Future of Eminent Domain and Urban Development 
after County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 837, 842 (2004) (discussing the impact of Poletown in 
jurisdictions throughout the United States). 
69 See infra Part V. 
70 Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 465 (Ryan, J. dissenting). 
71 See id.  at 472-75. 
72 Id. at 480 (stating that a public benefit was an “insufficient condition for the existence of a public use”). 
73 Id. at 481. 
74 Hawaii Housing Authority v.Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
75 Id. at 231. 
76 See id. at 232. 
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public tranquility and welfare.”77  To remedy this situation, the state decided to employ its power 
of eminent domain to break up the estates of the larger landowners by requiring them to sell land 
that they leased to others.78 
The Court recognized that the main question involved interpretation of the public use 
requirement, and whether it permitted a state to take property and transfer it to a private entity to 
remedy the economic evils of a land oligopoly.  Relying partly on Berman, the Court held that 
the state’s actions were constitutional.79  According to the Court, the state’s police powers 
enabled it to take this property, and when the purpose is legitimate and not irrational, the Court 
will not invalidate the taking.80 
Relying on Berman, Poletown, and Midkiff, a number of states have found that 
condemnations based on economic development and slum clearance satisfy the public use 
requirement of their eminent domain provisions.81  As a result, municipalities have increasingly 
condemned property for subsequent transfers to private entities merely to improve a city’s 
economic standing or to redevelop an urban area.   
3. Kelo v. City of New London82 
The debate over whether economic development is a public use has recently reached its 
zenith in Kelo v. City of New London, a Supreme Court case involving facts strikingly similar to 
the facts in Poletown.  Like the City of Detroit’s decision to take private property and transfer it 
to the General Motors Corporation, the City of New London, Connecticut decided to take private 
                                                 
77 See id. at 232. 
78 See id. at  233. 
79 See id. at  241. 
80 See id. at  242-43. 
81 See supra  note 19. 
82 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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property and transfer it to Pfizer Pharmaceutical Company.83  The city based this action on the 
area’s need for revitalization and the possibility that a major corporation, in this case Pfizer, 
would create jobs, general tax revenue for the city, and, generally, “build momentum for the 
revitalization” of the area.84  Like Poletown, the taking in Kelo was based solely on the desire of 
economic development. 
Kelo was the first time that the Supreme Court has ever taken an official stance on 
whether taking private property for subsequent transfer to another private entity, based solely on 
economic development, is a valid public use.  In a five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the 
taking and declared that, in this particular instance, economic development is a public use.85  
According to the Court, this decision reflects its “longstanding policy of deference to legislative 
judgments” regarding eminent domain,86 which stems from Berman and Midkiff. 
Although the Court upheld the use of eminent domain for economic development in Kelo, 
it appeared to emphasize the need to look at the facts of each takings case.  In Kelo, the city’s 
actions were authorized under a state statute that specifically permitted the use of eminent 
domain for economic development.  In addition, the city had adopted a “comprehensive plan of 
development,” and had conducted a “thorough deliberation” of the plan of development.87  
According to the Court, these actions proved that the city’s condemnation decision was entitled 
to deference and appeared to sway the Court to its ultimate decision in favor of the city. 
However, the four dissenting justices opined that the Court’s review of the City’s actions 
was inadequate.  Justice O’Connor wrote that the majority’s holding “washed out” the distinction 
                                                 
83 See id. at  2658-59. 
84 See id. at 2659.  The majority opinion states that the City has underwent “[d]ecades of economic decline,” has 
been designated as a “distressed municipality,” and has had a major employer close its doors and move away within 
the last ten years.  See id. at 2658. The opinion also states that the unemployment rate was double that of the State 
and that its population was declining.  See id. at 2658. 
85 See id. 
86 See id. at 2663. 
87 See id. at 2665. 
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between private use and publice use, effectively deleting the public use clause from the Fifth 
Amendment.88  The dissenting judges all agreed that the Court’s decision to permit the 
condemnation based solely on economic development would likely pose problems in the future.   
II. PROHIBITING TAKINGS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Many state and federal courts, including the US Supreme Court, have held that Kelo-type 
takings are a valid public use that satisfy the eminent domain requirements in the federal and 
state constitutions.89   This, however, is slowly changing.  In a recent decision, the Michigan 
Supreme Court blocked an attempt to employ eminent domain for economic development.90  The 
Court held that takings based solely on economic development are contrary to the public use 
clause of the eminent domain doctrine.91  Many state and federal legislatures have recently 
proposed bills that would purport to prohibit Kelo-type takings.92 
A. County of Wayne v. Hathcock 
Twenty-three years after Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court unanimously overruled the 
oft-criticized decision.93  In Hathcock, the Court declared that justifying “the exercise of eminent 
domain solely [based on] the fact that the use of that property by a private entity seeking its own 
profit might contribute to the economy’s health is to render impotent our constitutional 
limitations on the government’s power of eminent domain.”94  In Hathcock, the county planned 
                                                 
88 See id. at 2671. 
89 See supra note 19. 
90 See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 785 (Mich. 2004).   
91 See id. 
92 See supra note 29. 
93 Poletown has been cited as one of the most controversial decisions in Michigan jurisprudence, and one of the most 
significant decisions in the nation on the subject of eminent domain in the years following Berman. See, e.g., City of 
Detroit v. Vavro, 442 N.W.2d 730, 731 (Mich. App. 1989)  (“In any event, as much as we would wish the Supreme 
Court to overrule Poletown, we are compelled to apply it until they do so.”); Jones, supra note 10, at 295 (stating 
that Poletown “reduced the public use requirement to an ineffectual safeguard of private property rights). 
94 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 482. 
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to build a “metropolitan park” onto an airport by using its eminent domain powers to take the 
necessary amount of property.  Property owners filed suit, arguing that because the park would 
house various private business, it was a private-to-private transfer and contrary to the public use 
clause of the state’s eminent domain provisions.   
The Court reviewed its state’s public use jurisprudence and concluded that condemnations 
for subsequent transfer to private entities satisfy the public use clause of Michigan’s 
constitutional eminent domain provision only when they “[p]ossess[ ] one of the three 
characteristics in pre-1963 case law identified by Justice Ryan” in his Poletown dissent.95  In this 
case, the Court held that the taking did not pass constitutional muster because the park was not 
for “instrumentalities of commerce,” would not remain accountable to the public, and was not 
condemned based on “facts of independent public significance.” 
The third prong of the Court’s three-part test provides that the government can transfer land 
to a private entity if the land is condemned based on “facts of independent public significance.”96  
According to the Court, “need to remedy urban blight for the sake of public health and safety” is 
a paradigmatic example of this prong.97   The Court explained that, when authorities seek to 
                                                 
95 Id. at 781  As noted earlier, the Court found that condemnations for purposes of transferring property to a private 
entity will satisfy the public use clause if they involve “public necessity of the extreme sort otherwise 
impracticable.” Id. (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 675 (Ryan, J., dissenting)) This, the Court explained, occurs 
when eminent domain is used to build “highways, railroads, canals, and other instrumentalities of commerce.” Id.  In 
these situations, the condemnation requires “collective action” in order to avoid hold-out tactics among property 
owners who refuse to sell their “land for any amount less than fifty times its appraised value.” Id. at 781-82.  
Further, the Court found that if the private entity remains “accountable to the public in its use of that property,” the 
transfer to the private entity satisfies the public use clause. Id. at 782. This requires that the public have some 
“measure of control” over the subsequent use of the property. Id.  For example, when eminent domain is used to 
build a petroleum pipeline owned by a private corporation, and that corporation “pledge[s] itself to transport in 
interstate commerce” and operate “pursuant to directions” from the state, the public has control over the property. 
Id. (citing Lakehead Pipe Line Co. v. Dehn, 64 N.W.2d 903 (1954)). 
96 Id. at 783. 
97 Id. 
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remove blight, “the underlying purposes for resorting to condemnation, rather than the 
subsequent use of condemned land . . . satisf[ies] the Constitution’s public use requirement.”98 
In her partial concurrence and partial dissent, Justice Weaver was not convinced that the 
majority’s three-part categorization of the public use clause would be effective.99  For example, 
Justice Weaver explained that it is “easy to imagine how the people’s limit on the exercise of 
eminent domain might be eroded” when authorities condemn property based on “facts of 
independent public significance.”100  She further explained that, under this categorization, a 
municipality could effortlessly stretch blight designations and declare any property blighted for 
the sole purpose of transferring the property to another private entity.101 
 The policy underlying the decision in Hathcock has been recognized in a limited number 
of other states as well.102  In those states, courts have ruled that permitting private-to-private 
transfers based on economic benefits gives local authorities a blank check in their powers of 
eminent domain.103  Those that have banned Poletown and Kelo-type uses of eminent domain 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 See id. at 797 (Weaver, J., concurring) (stating that the categorization is “better suited to articles in law journals 
that have no force of law than it is to judicial opinions”). 
100 Id. (Weaver, J., concurring). 
101 See id. (stating that a municipality “could declare the lack of a two-car garage to be evidence of blight,” or 
“justify condemning a small brake repair business so that the property can be used for a hardware store”). 
102 See Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1, 8-9 (Ill. 
2002) (stating that, although the term public use is “flexible,” it does not “equate to unfettered ability to exercise 
takings beyond constitutional boundaries”); Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 
111 (NJ Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (stating that when property is taken through the use of eminent domain and 
transferred to a private developer, there are no assurances that the public interest will be protected). 
103 See, e.g., Daniels v. The Arena Plan Comm’n of Allen County, 306 F.3d 445, 466 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The public 
use requirement would be rendered meaningless if it encompassed speculative future public benefits that could 
accrue only if a landowner chooses to use his property in a beneficial, but not mandated, manner.”); 99 Cents Only 
Stores v. Lancaseter Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1129-30 (D. C.D. Cal. 2001) (concluding that a 
condemnation to satisfy “private expansion demands” of major retailer violated the public use requirement); Bailey 
v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)(finding that the construction of a large retail store did not satisfy public 
use); Southwestern Illinois Development Authority, 768 N.E.2d at 8 (Ill. 2002) (stating that, because every lawful 
business incidentally creates some positive economic growth, the use of eminent domain can not be justified solely 
on the basis of economic development and therefore a parking garage structure did not satisfy the public use 
requirement);  Casino Reinvestment, 727 A.2d at 111 (finding that hotel development project proposed by hotel 
operator was not a public use); Georgia Dept. of Transp. v. Jasper County, 586 S.E.2d 853 (S.C., 2003) (Proposed 
marine terminal projected an economic benefit, but was not a public use to justify eminent domain); Dickgieser v. 
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continue to allow condemnations for private-to-private transfer on the basis of urban blight 
removal.104  In classifying blight removal as a public use, the intent to protect property owners 
from Poletown-type abuses of eminent domain is, in the words of Justice Weaver, “less 
certain.”105 
B. State and Federal Leglisation 
 The Hathcock decision and the public outcry from Kelo sparked numerous state and 
federal bills on the subject.106  In 2005, the Federal Government proposed a bill attempting to 
eliminate Kelo-type takings, i.e. private-to-private transfers based solely on economic 
development.  The Private Property Rights Protection Act denies federal economic assistance to 
any state or governmental entity that uses the power of eminent domain for private-to-private 
transfers based on economic development.107  The Act states that Congress specifically found 
that the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision increases the threat of eminent domain abuse, especially 
in rural areas.108  The Act also declares that Congress has a duty to protect rural Americans’ 
property rights.109 
Many state legislatures have proposed bills prohibiting Kelo-type takings after the 
massive public outcry from the potential affects of the Kelo decision.110  However, most of these 
bills contain exceptions in the case of blighted properties, where, if the government determines 
                                                                                                                                                             
State, 76 P.3d 288 (Wash. App. Div. 2003) (finding that no taking occurred in inverse condemnation case because 
logging on state land that channeled water on adjoining property was not a public use). 
104 See, e.g., Bailey v. Myers, 76 P.3d 898, 904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (stating that slum or blight removal is a factor 
considered in determining whether taking is for private or public use); Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. 
Mayor and Council of Borough of Princeton, 851 A.2d 685 (N.J. 2004) (stating that blight removal is a public use). 
105 Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 797 (Weaver, J., concurring) Justice Weaver stated that the majority’s three part 
categorization approach to public use made the “intended protections from . . . encroachments on protected rights 
less certain because it moves away from the constitutional text.” Id. 
106 See supra note 29. 
107 H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005). 
108 H.R. REP. NO. 109-262, at § 7(a) (2005). 
109 H.R. REP. NO. 109-262, at § 7(b) (2005). 
110 See supra note 29. 
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that a property is blighted because it is economically underdeveloped, the government can 
transfer the property to another private party.111  Critics say that this creates a loophole for 
governments to engage in Kelo-type takings because these types of takings can be disguised 
under the blight exception, especially where the definitions of blight include property that is 
“economically obsolete.”112 
III. THE BLIGHT EXCEPTION AS SWALLOWING THE RULE 
Throughout the United States, local governments often clash with citizens over what 
constitutes a blighted area.113  Broad statutory definitions of blight combined with limited 
judicial review have resulted in blight designations that many citizens disagree with.  When 
governments transfer this property to a private company, which commonly happens, property 
owners claim a violation of the public use clause of the eminent domain doctrine. 
A. Background on Urban Blight 
The concept of blight arose out of the problems caused by America’s rapidly transformed 
landscape and officials’ attempts at slum removal.  By the mid-twentieth century, most officials 
acknowledged the existence of slums.  However, these officials continued to search for a 
justification to revitalize those urban areas that were economically or socially problematic, but 
had not yet risen to the deterioration level of a slum.114   
                                                 
111 See id.  
112 See Ashley J. Furhmeister, In the Name of Economic Development: Reviving “Public Use” as a Limitation on 
the Eminent Domain Power in the Wake of Kelo v. City of New London, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 171 (2005) (stating that 
blight criteria should be carefully defined to prevent a blight loophole to economic development) 
113 See In Ohio, A Test For Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, June 22, 2003, at A03; Christopher S. Brown, Blinded 
by the Blight: A Search for a Workable Definition of “Blight” in Ohio, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 207 (2004). 
114 See 2A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §2.51561[1] (3d rev. ed. 1975) (stating that blight is slum prevention, by 
eliminating the areas that tend to produce slums); MABEL WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS 5 (1938) (defining 
blight as “[a]n area in which deteriorating forces have obviously reduced economic and social values to such a 
degree that widespread rehabilitation is necessary to forestall the development of an actual slum condition”); see 
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Blight provided officials with justification to remedy economically and socially declining 
areas.  It was conveniently defined more broadly than “slum,” and was often viewed as the 
“disease or cancer” that created slums.115  Courts upheld condemnations based on blight removal 
on the ground that they were related to the traditional “police power” objectives, i.e. improving 
the public health, safety, and welfare.116  Although local authorities subsequently transferred the 
property to a private entity for development, this was recognized as incidental to the “controlling 
purpose” of slum clearance.117  In one case, the Court even took judicial notice that “razing [ ] 
unsanitary dwellings tends to diminish the potentialities of epidemics, crime and waste, and that 
the destruction of slums at their focal centers prevents the spread of crime and disease to 
uninfected areas and enhances the physical and moral values of surrounding communities.”118 
States quickly declared that blight removal fulfilled the “public use” clause of their 
eminent domain provisions.119  Legislatures acknowledged the existence of “substandard and 
insanitary areas”120 and determined that these conditions impaired “the economic value of large 
areas, infecting them with economic blight.”  Further, legislatures declared that clearing these 
areas was “necessary for the public welfare; [and] are public uses and purposes for which private 
property may be acquired.”121  When litigation between the affected parties ultimately reached 
                                                                                                                                                             
also Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent 
Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 18 (2003) (discussing the discovery of blight). 
115 Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 310 (2004). 
116 See id. at 335-36 (stating that all presumptions are in favor of the constitutionality of the condemnation and citing 
cases in different states who agree).  
117 See In re Slum Clearance in City of Detroit, 50 N.W.2d 340 (Mich. 1951) (upholding the condemnation because 
the public purpose of slum clearance is the one controlling purpose of the condemnation). 
118 In re Edward J. Jeffries Homes Housing Project, City of Detroit, 11 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. 1943) (holding that the 
public use requirement of eminent domain was met when the City condemned a housing project on the basis of slum 
clearance). 
119 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.902 (West 1997). 
120 § 125.902 
121 § 125.902 
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their respective courts, the condemnations were approved and the legislation was largely upheld 
as constitutional.122 
1. The U.S. Supreme Court Holds that Blight Satisfies Public Use  
In 1954, Congress declared that the whole D.C. area would be replanned and redeveloped 
because of its “obsolete lay-out . . . substandard housing[,] and blighted areas.”123  Congress 
embarked on this massive urban redevelopment campaign by utilizing its eminent domain 
powers to condemn property of owners who would not voluntarily sell.  Additionally, Congress 
emphasized its preference of “private enterprise over public agencies in executing the 
redevelopment plan,” and declared that this exercise of the eminent domain power was a public 
use.124   
 An owner of a department store located within this urban renewal area brought suit, 
objecting to the government’s condemnation efforts.125  The store owner urged that because the 
project would redevelop the land for private uses, it violated the public use provision in the 
Federal Constitution.126  The case went in front of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Court reviewed the constitutionality of this legislation, and its decision was 
persuasive throughout the nation.127  The Court decided that the legislation, under the Federal 
Constitution, was valid under the legislature’s police power.128  The Court largely deferred to the 
                                                 
122 See In re Brewster Street Housing Site, 289 N.W. 504 (Mich. 1939)(stating that “[t]he power of eminent domain 
may be lawfully resorted to when authorized by the legislature to take the property of private individuals for 
purposes justifiable only under the police power of the State”).  The Brewster Court also stated that at least 30 states 
had enacted identical legislation and in every instance where the legislation was challenged, it was upheld by courts. 
See id. 
123 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 28 (1954). 
124 Id. at 29 
125 See id. at 31. 
126 See id. at 31. 
127 See cases cited supra note 19. 
128 See Berman, 348 U.S. at 31-32. Because the legislature is the “main guardian of the public needs to be served by 
social legislation,” the Court stated that the “role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being 
exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.” Id. at 32. 
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legislature’s judgment in determining whether the taking was for the public use: “[w]hen the 
legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive,”129 
thereby extracating any judicial review of condemnations based on urban renewal efforts.  The 
Court upheld the condemnation, even after acknowledging that the property was transferred to 
private developers.130  It concluded that the public use requirement in the Fifth Amendment is 
fulfilled simply when property is taken to eliminate the “blighted areas that tend to produce 
slums,” and that any private interests that are served as a result are unimportant to the inquiry.131   
This interpretation of the “public use” definition, and the concomitant judicial deference 
given to legislative determinations of what is a “public use,” supported states in their attempts to 
use eminent domain as a tool for urban redevelopment projects.  As courts nationwide largely 
removed themselves from reviewing the use of eminent domain to take land for urban renewal, 
the definition of blight was even more broadly construed.132  As one sociologist explained, the 
definition of blight is that “this land is too good for these people.”133   
B. Broad Statutory Definitions of Blight that Permit the use of Eminent Domain for 
Private Uses 
Hathcock’s “facts of independent public significance” exception exists because, 
according to the Court, “the act of condemnation itself, rather than the use to which the land 
would eventually be put, [is] a public use.”  This exception is dangerous because broad blight 
definitions that go beyond the traditional understanding of blighted or slum property would 
permit exactly what Hathcock and many recent state legislation want to ban—Kelo-type 
                                                 
129 Id. at 32. 
130 See id. at 33-34. 
131 Id. at 35. 
132 See cases cited supra note 19; see also 2a NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §7.2[2] (3d rev. ed. 1975) (discussing 
the broad view of public use as distinguished from the narrow view). 
133 SCOTT GREER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES: THE DILEMMA OF DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION 31 
(1965). 
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takings.  Blight definitions provide local governments with a considerable amount of 
discretion and creativity when determining whether an area is blighted and has led to 
frequent disagreements between property owners and governments over what constitutes a 
blighted area.134  Although broad definitions of blight are beneficial in that they give officials 
discretion in determing which areas should be revitalized and also give officials the ability to 
override objections of a few landowners in large urban renewal projects, the potential for 
abuse inherent in such discretionary authority is motive to narrow blight definitions. 
 A few real-world examples accentuate the problem of broad blight definitions.  In 
Ohio, a city council has determine a neighborhood blighted because houses in the 
neighborhood do not have attached garages or central air-conditioning.135  If a Court agreed, 
then the city would be allowed to take the property and even transfer it to another private 
party.  In Michigan, a city council has determined a thirty-five acre neighborhood 
surrounding Michigan State University blighted because it contains numerous rental 
properties (mostly for students that attend the University) that the council considers 
undesirable and its property values are not rising fast enough.136  The city has plans to 
transfer this property to private developers to rebuild it into a mixture of housing, retail, and 
commercial centers.137 
While these examples may be extreme, they exemplify the potential for abuse of broad 
blight definitions and the resulting ability to circumvent any attempt by a city to ban Kelo-type 
takings.  If neighborhoods are blighted because the houses do not have central air-conditioning 
                                                 
134 See Steven Greehut, The Blight of Eminent Domain, The Freeman: Ideas of Liberty, Sept. 2002, at 8, available at 
http://www.fee.org; Blain Harden, In Ohio, A Test for Eminent Domain, WASH. POST, June 22, 2003, at A03; Sam 
Staley, Wrecking Property rights, REASON, Feb. 2003, at 32. 
135 See Eminent Domain—Being Abused?-CBS News, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/60minutes/main575343.shtml (July 4, 2004). 
136 See Shikha Dalmia, Blight Loophole Could Allow Cities to Grab Homes, Land, DET. NEWS, Nov. 3, 2005. 
137 See id. 
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or the property values are not rising fast enough, it is easy to see how neighborhoods nationwide 
could be designated as blighted and transferred to a more profitable company.  If blight exists 
because the property is “economically underutilized” or “economically obsolete,” then it is 
difficult to imagine any property as being safe from condemnation when comparing it to the 
economic benefits of a corporation. 138   
IV. IS A HEIGHTENED STANDARD OF PROOF A SOLUTION? 
Out of the many proposed bills banning Kelo-type takings, a few legislatures have recognized 
the need to address the potential loophole that arises from a broad definition of blight.139  This 
potential for abuse is enhanced because a majority of courts review municipalities’ blight 
designations under deferential standards of review, such as “arbitrary or capricious,” “clear 
error,” or “abuse of discretion.”140  A few states have recently proposed bills that would increase 
the standard of reviewing blight designations.141   
Three states have bill proposals that attempt to fix the problem by placing the burden on the 
condemnor to show blight by clear and convincing evidence.142  In Michigan, the legislature has 
                                                 
138 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 11-99-1 (1975) (economically distressed); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.335 (West 2000) 
(economically distressed); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-4743 (“contributing little to the tax income of the state and its 
municipalities”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205:1 (impairing “economic values”); McKinney's Private Housing 
Finance Law § 11-a(impairing economic growth); OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 11, § 38-102  (property that “retards sound 
economic development”); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1702  (harmful to the “economic well-being”).  
139 See Castle Coalition, Legislative Center, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/index.html. 
140 See Hudson Hayes Luce, The Meaning of Blight: A Survey of Statutory and Case Law, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 389 (2000). 
141 See Castle Coalition Legislative Center, http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/index.html (detailing all 
federal and state proposed bills regarding eminent domain). 
142 In Michigan, the state legislature has passed a proposed constitutional amendment that requires a condemnor to 
show clear and convincing evidence of blight. See S. J. Res. E, 93rd Leg. (Mich. 2005). In Arizona, a proposed bill 
states that a takng creates a presumption that it is for a private use, and the burden is on the condemnor to show by 
clear and convincing evidence facts rebutting the presumption.  See H.R. 2002, 47th Leg. (Ariz. 2006).  In Missouri, 
a proposed bill would modify the laws relating to eminent domain and “blighted areas” to specifically state that 
economic underutilization shall not be a valid factor in determining blight. In addition to the current definition of 
blight, this section requires that the property in question satisfy the following criteria: 1. The property is in an area of 
high unemployment; and 2. The property is one with low fiscal capacity; and 3. The area containing the 
redevelopment area is characterized by low income. The section also makes the determinations of blight or 
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proposed and passed a constitutional amendment that would require the state to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the property that is being condemned based on blight is truly 
blighted.143  In Arizona, the legislature similarly proposed a constitutional amendment creating a 
presumption that all takings based on blight are for a private use, and places the burden on the 
condemnor to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.144  A bill in Missouri 
would modify the state’s statutory definition of blight, prohibiting “economic underutilization” 
from being a factor in determining blight, and requiring the condemnor to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence the sufficiency of its findings of blight.145 
A. Clear and Convincing Evidence—The Burden 
The function of any standard of proof is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of 
confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a 
particular type of adjudication.”146  Three standards of proof are generally recognized by 
courts.147  The least demanding standard, employed in civil cases, is the “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard.  Preponderance of the evidence exists where the jury is satisfied that the 
probability of the correctness of the evidence is greater than fifty percent, i.e. that it is more 
likely than not that the plaintiff has a right to recover.148   An intermediate threshold is the “clear 
and convincing” standard, which is reserved to protect particularly important interests in a 
                                                                                                                                                             
conservation area a quasi-judicial function, attaching the rights of procedural due process to affected landowners and 
requiring the governing body to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law displaying clear and convincing 
evidence for the sufficiency of such finding of blight or conservation area. The findings of fact may be reviewed, de 
novo, at the request of any owner of property deemed blighted.. See S.B. 560, § 99.805, 93rd Gen. Assem. (Miss. 
2006). 
143 See S. J. Res. E, 93rd Leg. (Mich. 2005). 
144 See H.R. 2002, 47th Leg. (Ariz. 2006).   
145 See S.B. 560, § 99.805, 93rd Gen. Assem. (Miss. 2006). 
146 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970). 
147 Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
148 See Metropolitan Stevedor Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121 (1997). 
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limited number of civil cases.149  Finally, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is employed 
when determining guilt in a criminal prosecution, and is the toughest burden to meet.150 
The clear and convincing standard places the risk of an erroneous factual decision of blight 
on the government instead of the property owner.   It is normally used to protect particularly 
important individual interests that have more than monetary value, reflecting a “fundamental 
assessment of the comparative social costs . . . of erroneous factual determinations.”151  Courts 
have found this intermediate standard to be appropriate in cases involving civil commitment,152 
libel,153 deportation,154 and denaturalization,155 along with cases involving property rights, such 
as zoning classifications,156 patent invalidity,157 and water rights disputes.158  It is a burden 
imposed on a party out of constitutional or policy considerations,159 and has been defined as 
requiring a “high probability of truth” 160 or producing a “firm belief or conviction” in the mind 
of the factfinder that an allegation is true.161   
                                                 
149 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990). 
150 See U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
151 Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1192 (1993) (finding that the clear and convincing standard must be used in 
determining priority of invention). 
152 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433-32 (1979) (court found the clear and convincing standard appropriate 
to decide whether appellant was mentally ill and required hospitalization for his own welfare). 
153 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (finding that, in action by private individual against 
licensed radio station for defamation, clear and convincing standard was appropriate). 
154 See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) 
155 See Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943). 
156 See, e.g., Meyers v. City of Baton Rouge, 185 So. 2d 278 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966); State ex rel. Thomas v. 
Ludewig, 116 Ohio App. 329, 187 N.E.2d 170 (1st Dist. Butler County 1962); Cushman v. City of Racine, 39 Wis. 
2d 303, 159 N.W.2d 67 (1968); City of Greeley v. Ells, 186 Colo. 352, 527 P.2d 538 (1974); Cole-Collister Fire 
Protection Dist. v. City of Boise, 93 Idaho 558, 468 P.2d 290 (1970); Tomasek v. City of Des Plaines, 64 Ill. 2d 
172, 354 N.E.2d 899 (1976). 
157 See Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1195 (1993) 
158 See Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984). 
159 See id. 
160 See Cross v. Ledford, 120 N.E.2d 118 (Ohio 1954) 
161 See In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich 1995).  “Evidence is ‘clear and convincing’ when it produces in mind of 
trier of fact firm belief or conviction as to truth of allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct, 
weighty, and convincing as to enable factfinder to come to clear conviction, without hesitancy, of truth of precise 
facts in issue.” Id. 
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The clear and convincing standard is applied in a variety of cases involving eminent domain.  
Usually, it is a burden placed on the property owner who is challenging the taking to overcome a 
presumption that the condemnation is valid.162  While the condemnor may have an initial burden 
to show that the proposed taking is reasonable, most courts have expressed extreme deference 
toward the condemning authority in its decisions to employ the power of eminent domain. 163  
The new standards created by Michigan, Arizona, and Missouri would change this deferential 
standard of review and place most of the burden at the outset on the state or municipality. 
Although this heightened standard is likely the correct standard to use when dealing with 
important interests such as property rights, it is difficult to apply to the currently broad blight 
definitions.  It will lead to one of two extremes.   First, because most definitions of blight broadly 
permit economic considerations to be the sole factor in blight determination, even under a clear 
and convincing standard, the government could engage in Kelo-type takings if they can clearly 
and convincingly prove that the property is economically substandard.  The second extreme is 
                                                 
162 See Matter of Egg Harbor Associates, 94 N.J. 358, 374 (1983) (holding that “[t]he burden of demonstrating that a 
taking has occurred lies upon the party alleging that the state action is unconstitutional. Proof must be by clear and 
convincing evidence.”); Village of Wheeling v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Chicago, 572 N.E.2d 966,972, (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991) (The property owner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the ordinance is arbitrary and 
unreasonable and bears no substantial relation to the public health, safety or welfare.); State Highway Comm. v. 
Crossen-Nissen Co., 400 P.2d 283, 285 (1965) (The condemnor’s choice is given great weight and will not be 
overturned except on clear and convincing proof that the decision was excessive or arbitrary); Rudder v. Wise 
County Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 249 S.E.2d 177, 178 (Va. 1978) (Condemnor’s finding that area 
was blighted was presumptively correct, and burden was upon property owners to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the finding was arbirary and unwarranted).  
163 See Norwood v. Horney, 830 N.E.2d 381, 388-89 (Ohio App. 2005).  In Norwood, the court stated that “[t]he 
Ohio Supreme Court requires that we give the definition of “blighted area” a liberal interpretation.” Id. Once a 
legislative determination of blight has been made, “courts are required to and should be zealous in giving such 
determination by the city great weight.” Id.    
“We will not substitute our judgment for that of the legislative body of the city in an area 
appropriate for legislative determination.  Nor will we interpose, without clear and convincing 
reason to do so, our authority between council and the citizens of the city to frustrate a 
determination and plan so adopted.  Our role in determining whether governmental power has 
been exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.”  
Id.; see also City of Fairbanks v. Metro Co.  540 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Alaska 1975).  “We hold today that in general 
condemnation proceedings . . . once the condemnor has presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that a 
particular taking is ‘reasonably requisite’ for the effectuation of the authorized public purpose for which it is sought, 
particular questions as to the route, location, or amount of property to be taken are to be left to the sound discretion 
of the condemning authority absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence that such determinations are the 
product of fraud, caprice, or arbitrariness.”  Id. 
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the ending of all attempts to remedy blighted property because of the difficulty, expense, and 
time intensity in proving a broad concept by clear and convincing evidence.  Neither of these 
extremes are acceptable. 
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B. Requiring Heightened Standard of Proof Might Still Permit Kelo-type Takings 
Broad blight definitions might still permit Kelo-type takings, even under the clear and 
convincing standard.  When blight is defined in terms such as property that is “economically 
obsolete,” “deteriorated,” or “overcrowded,” the clear and convincing standard would be easy to 
meet, yet would still permit Kelo-type takings under the guise of blight.  In Kelo, the City of 
New London could have blighted the property, and the taking might have been upheld under the 
heightened standard of proof because the blight definition broadly included economic factors.    
In Poletown, the Michigan Supreme Court created a heightened standard of review of 
private-to-private takings, and still upheld a taking for private to private transfer based solely on 
economic benefits.164  This heightened standard proved to be ineffective in subsequent cases 
because it essentially required clear and convincing proof of any public benefit, which, at that 
time, meant anything that bolstered the economy.165  Similarly, the clear and convincing standard 
as applied to currently broad blight definitions will not have the intended effect of prohibiting 
Kelo-type takings. 
C. Requiring Heightened Standard of Proof Might Lead to More Public Ownership 
of Property or Quash all Efforts of Eliminating Blight 
Requiring the government to prove blight by clear and convincing evidence if it plans to 
transfer the property to a private party could also result in increased public ownership of 
property, or even an end of all efforts to remedy blight.  The difficulty in applying the clear and 
convincing standard to a broad concept creates confusion and uncertainty.  Instead of expending 
                                                 
164 See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634-35 (1981) (overruled by County of 
Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004)). 
165 See, e.g., Tolksdorff v. Griffith, 626 N.W.2d 163, 167-69 (Mich. 2001) (invalidating legislation that allows 
condemnation of limited amounts of property in order to build roads for the benefit of landlocked property owners); 
City of Lansing v. Edward Rose Realty, Inc., 502 N.W.2d 638, 643-46 (Mich. 1993) (invalidating taking of two 
apartment complexes for the benefit of a cable television company); City of Center Line v. Chmelko,, 416 N.W.2d 
401, 402, 404-407 (1987) (invalidating condemnation of “two parcels of property” in order to facilitate expansion of 
a “local car dealership”). 
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time and money on determining what evidence will satisfy a heightened burden of proof, 
officials will either forego transferring property to private entities and instead transfer only to 
public entities, or forego using eminent domain altogether on “blighted” property.   
The increased time and money involved in proving blight designations by clear and 
convincing evidence might result in the government foregoing all efforts to transfer blighted 
property to private entities and instead transferring it to public entities.  This might result in 
public ownership of a large amount of urban property, if the city has the funds to provide just 
compensation to property owners.  Further, this newly created public property could, in the 
future, be leased or even sold to private entities! 
Requiring the clear and convincing standard of proof might also end any attempts at 
remedying blighted property.  This is especially true where cities do not have the money to 
acquire the property itself and would have had to rely on private entities to finance these 
projects. 
V. REQUIRING BOTH PHYSICAL AND ECONOMIC BLIGHT:  BACK TO TRADITIONAL NOTIONS 
If states narrow their definitions of blight it will close the blight loophole around the ban on 
Kelo-type takings and will also give municipalities more certainty in their blight condemnations.  
Specifically, states should require that the government show objective evidence of both physical 
and economic blight.  This will still give municipalities the power of eminent domain over truly 
blighted property even if it chooses to transfer the property to a private entity and will also 
strengthen the ban on Kelo-type takings by prohibiting blight designations based solely on 
economic factors.   
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1. Traditional Notion of Blight—Both Physical and Economical Evidence 
As previously discussed, broad definitions of blight are vulnerable to creative expansion.  
This is at odds with definitions of blight in early blight cases of the 1940s and 50s, where 
governments’ designations of blighted areas were more closely aligned to the traditional, 
layperson’s notion of blight.166  This traditional notion of blight included high crime, dilapidated, 
and disease infested neighborhoods, combined with substandard economic conditions.   
 Berman exemplifies this traditional notion of blight that existed in the mid-twentieth 
century.  In Berman, the property was characterized by “[m]iserable and disreputable housing 
conditions,” where “64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4% needed major repairs, 
only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 
29.3% lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, [and] 83.8% lacked central 
heating.”167  The neighborhood in Berman more closely fit the layperson’s notion of blight than 
today’s blight designations, where property is condemned because houses lack attached garages 
or central air conditioning. 
 Indeed, returning to a traditional notion of blight that existed in the mid-twentieth century 
would be consistent with current judicial opinions and state bills attempting to prohibit Kelo-type 
                                                 
166 See, e.g., County of Riverside v. City of Murrieta, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 606 (Cal. App. 1998) (stating that “true blight 
is expressed by the kind of dire inner-city slum conditions described in the [1964] Bunker Hill case: unacceptable 
living conditions of 82 percent; unacceptable building conditions of 76 percent; crime rate of double the city's 
average; arrest rate of eight times the city's average; fire rate of nine times the city's average; and the cost of city 
services more than seven times the cost of tax revenues”); Kaskel v. Impellitteri, 115 N.E.2d 659, 661 (N.Y. 1953) 
(The Court found blight where 20% of the land was occupied by dwellings more than sixty years old, 7% of the site 
is covered by hotels and rooming houses, 34% of the land is covered by parking lots, and 39% is occupied by 
nonresidential structures and, although the buildings are not as dilapidated as those discribed in novels, there is 
ample evidence that the area is “substandard and insanitary” by modern tests.  The Court also stated that “[o]ne can 
conceive of a hypothetical case where the physical conditions of an area might be such that it would be irrational 
and baseless to call it substandard or insanitary, in which case, probably, the conditions for the exercise of the power 
would not be present.”); Oliver v. City of Clairton, 98 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1953) (finding that blight existed where over 
50% of the dwelling units were substandard of slum quality, lots were not of adequate width, over 90% of the land 
was vacant, and the area was both socially and economically undesirable); Foeller v. Housing Authority of Portland, 
256 P.2d 752 (Or. 1953) (finding that blight existed where houses were substandard, residential and factor structures 
disadvantaged those who lived in the area, there was heavy traffic passing through the area, and the area had a bad 
record for crime, fires, juvenile dependency and delinquency). 
167 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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takings.  The Michigan Supreme Court in Hathcock supported returning to original public use 
jurisprudence when it based its three factor test on pre-1963 jurisprudence.168  Current proposed 
state bills seeking to ban Kelo-type takings are also a signal to return to mid-twentieth century 
public use jurisprudence.169 
2. Requiring Objective Evidence of Physical and Economic Blight 
The main problem with current blight definitions is that they permit blight designations 
based solely on economic factors, which turns blight into a loophole around the ban on Kelo-type 
takings.  Removing all economic factors from the definition of blight would ensure that 
municipalities could not utilize eminent domain for purely economic development purposes, but 
would also remove a key objective factor in determining whether an area is truly blighted.  Since 
blighted areas tend to be economically substandard, among other things, economic criteria are 
important in blight designations.  Therefore, although economic factors cannot be the only set of 
factors relied on in blight designations, they do hold some credence. 
 Economic factors combined with objective physical indicators of blight will ensure that 
property is not determined blighted solely for economic development purposes while fulfilling 
the traditional, layperson’s notion of blighted property.  At least one state currently requires both 
physical and economic evidence of blight.  In California, areas are blighted only if they feature at 
least one of four “physical” conditions, and at least one of five “economic” conditions.170  This 
requirement has resulted in a number of blight rejections, but has upheld an equal number, 
                                                 
168 See County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 781 (Mich. 2004).   
169 See supra section IV. 
170 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031 (West 1999) 
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permitting the government to utilize eminent domain for private to private transfer where an area 
is truly blighted.171     
3. Objective Physical Indicators of Blight 
 Returning to the traditional notion of blight by requiring both physical and economic 
evidence of blight will ensure that bans on Kelo-type takings are fully effected, putting teeth 
back into the public use limitation on the state’s power of eminent domain.  Requiring that the 
government show physical evidence of blight will ensure that property is not taken solely for 
economic development purposes.  These physical indicators of blight, however, must be 
objectively based to promote confidence in the law and remove the “I know it when I see it” 
attitude.  
Current blight definitions include subjective physical factors that are vague and in 
conflict with traditional notions of blight.  Factors such as “building obsolescence” and 
“incompatible land use” are easily manipulated and do not comport with traditional notions of 
                                                 
171 See Blue v. City of Los Angeles, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 10 (Cal. App. 2006) (upholding blight designation where 
project area had high vacancy rates, low lease rates, residential overcrowding); Evans v. City of San Jose, 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 675 (Cal. App. 2005) (upholding blight designation because record demonstrated that redevelopment was 
necessary, private enterprise had little incentive to invest in the blighted area, government action alone could not 
reverse all blight conditions, and aggregations of smaller parcels required assistance of public sector and 
redevelopment agency); San Franciscans Upholding the Downtown Plan v. City & County of San Fransisco, 125 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. App. 2002) (upholding blight designation because city engaged in exhaustive analyses, the 
environmental impact report (EIR) and redevelopment agency's report provided substantial evidence to satisfy the 
finding of physical blight, all but one of the major buildings in redevelopment area were built in or before 1955, nine 
of the 12 buildings were in a seriously deteriorated condition, with significant physical deficiencies that rendered 
them unsafe and unhealthy for occupancy by workers and the public, and at least eight of the 12 buildings were 
susceptible to collapse in event of a moderate to strong earthquake). 
See Graber v. City of Upland, 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 649 (Cal. App. 2002) (striking down blight designation because 
definitions of "deficient" and "deteriorated" as used in field survey of structures in redevelopment project area were 
overbroad for purposes of finding that the structures were physically blighted, and thus evidence was insufficient to 
support finding that the area suffered from physical blight, although survey identified 85.5% of the structures in the 
area as deficient and 7.2% as deteriorated); Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redev. Agency, 98 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Cal. App. 2000) (striking down blight designation because building survey did not establish that 
buildings were unsafe or unhealthy and no evidence quantiifed how physical conditions rendered the use of 
buildings economically nonviable); Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar (95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 265 (Cal. App. 
2000) (striking down blight designation because not a single structure was identified by city as being unsafe or 
unhealthy, only one of 250 buildings in project area was identified as being in need of extensive rehabilitation, and 
consultant who drafted blight assessment report referred only to potential health and safety considerations). 
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blight.172  Requiring governmental officials to show building obsolescense through direct, 
objective factors would promote certainty for both property owners and government officials.173   
Objectively based physical indicators of blight are those that are not subject to 
manipulation by government officials and are specifically linked to the underlying blight 
condition.  Such factors include dilapidated buildings, buildings that are fire hazards, buildings 
with sanitation problems, and abandoned buidlings.  Those buildings that present a real danger to 
the public’s health and safety, such as those with structural instability, would comport with a 
layperson’s notion of blight.  Abandoned buildings present a danger to the public’s health and 
safety as well because they tend to attract crime into the area and provide no return benefits to 
the community.  Buildings that are environmentally contaminated would also comport with the 
layperson’s notion of blight. 
States need to prevent the prospect of private investment to be the driving factor behind 
blight designations.  Property should be deemed blighted because it would traditionally be 
considered blighted.  Requiring objective evidence of both physical and economic blight before a 
government can designate a property as blighted and transfer the property to another private 
party will ensure that the primary reason for the taking is blight removal.  This will require states 
to adjust their current blight definitions.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The interpretation of the public use clause is currently undergoing transformation as a 
result of the political and legal battles over whether economic development is a public use and 
                                                 
172 See Christopher S. Brown, Blinded by the Blight: A Search for a Workable Definition of “Blight” in Ohio, 73 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 207, 226-231 (2004). 
173 See also Thaddeus L. Pitney, Loans, and Takings, and Buildings—Oh My!: A Necessary Difference Between 
Public Purpose and Public Use in Economic Development, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 321 (2006) (discussing that 
“eminent domain proceedings to pursue economic development goals should be limited to instances where there is 
a demonstrable direct public use”). 
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what qualifies as “blighted” property.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo has incited intense 
opposition to takings for private-to-private transfer based solely on economic development 
(Kelo-type takings).  Courts and legislatures have narrowed the public use clause in their search 
to prohibit Kelo-type takings.  The next step that some states have already initiated is to close the 
loophole that broad blight definitions create in this rule. 
States have attempted to close this loophole by requiring the government to prove blight 
by clear and convincing evidence.  This heightened standard, however, will likely lead to two 
extreme problems.  First, Kelo-type takings might still occur because broad blight definitions 
permit economic factors as the sole criteria of blight.  This is a problem because even proving 
that a property is economically deteriorated by clear and convincing evidence will still permit 
economic development takings.  On the other extreme, municipalities’ efforts of remedying 
blighted property might be quashed because many do not have the time or money to engage in 
lengthy evidence finding tasks to meet a heightened standard of proof.  Because most cities 
would not have the budget to purchase the property and transfer it to a public entity, it will be 
increasingly difficult to fix property that is truly blighted.  Because of these problems, the clear 
and convincing standard is unworkable for protecting property interests and for remedying 
property that is truly blighted.   
In this paper, I propose a return to traditional notions of blight by requiring objective 
evidence of both physical and economic blight.  This will ensure that the ban on Kelo-type 
takings is effected and that the government will still have the power to remedy truly blighted 
areas.  This will require that states amend their statutory blight definitions. 
 
 
